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The Hindenburg Disaster: Combining
Physics and History in the Laboratory
Gregory A. DiLisi, John Carroll University, University Heights, OH

T

why certain events unfolded.
his May marks the 80th
Far from being a set of agreed
anniversary of the Hinupon immutable facts, the
denburg disaster. On May
historical record is open to
6, 1937, the German passenger
reexamination and reinterprezeppelin Hindenburg, hovering
tation.
300 feet in the air and held aloft by
The case study also demonseven million cubic feet of hydrostrates to students the “perfect
gen gas, burst into flames while
storm scenario” —how a propreparing to dock at the Naval
gression of unlikely or unforeAir Station in Lakehurst, NJ (Fig.
seen events often results in a
1). Amazingly, the ensuing fire
catastrophic failure.
consumed the massive airship in
Next, we showcase how
only 35 seconds! In the aftermath,
scientists and engineers often
35 of 97 people onboard died (13
test analog materials in lieu of
passengers and 22 crewmen) plus
Fig. 1. The Hindenburg disaster, May 6, 1937. (Public Domain) actual substances if those subone member of the ground crew.
stances are prohibitively rare,
Herbert Morrison, the broadcaster
precious, expensive, or dangerous to test.
from Chicago’s WLS radio station, was on assignment that day
Finally, using an ASTM protocol for determining the flamcovering the arrival of the majestic airship. Morrison’s eyewitmability of textiles demonstrates the importance of operaness account of the disaster is legendary audio history. In fact,
tional definitions in scientific experiments. Students will see,
Morrison’s phrase, “Oh, the humanity!” has become a cultural
perhaps for the first time, that operational definitions involve
idiom.
the comparison of phenomena of interest against a known
We present the Hindenburg disaster as a case study in the
standard.
flammability of fabrics. Our goal is to examine the ship’s outer
covering and decide whether or not it was the fire’s initial
“This great floating palace”
source of fuel. To accomplish this, we piloted a basic vertical
flame test with students in an introductory-level undergraduWell, here it comes, ladies and gentlemen … No
ate laboratory. Our test is patterned after the protocol set forth
wonder this great floating palace can travel through
by the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)
the air at such a speed, with these powerful motors
for determining the flammability of textiles. The case study
behind it … The sun is striking the windows of the obprovides several unique teaching opportunities.
servation deck on the eastward side and sparkling like
First, we observe the anniversary of this tragedy by bringglittering jewels on the background of black velvet.1
ing it to the attention of a new generation of students, namely,
those currently enrolled in our courses. We provided students
The zeppelin LZ 129 Hindenburg (Luftschiff Zeppelin
with background information on the ship’s design, final
#129) was launched on May 4, 1936, as the premier passenger
voyage, and destruction. We used excerpts from Morrison’s
aircraft of the world’s first airline, Deutsche Luftschiffahrtsaccount to headline sections of our case study to more artistiAktiengesellschaft (DELAG), or the German Airship Transcally portray historical events. Reexamining a major historical
portation Corporation. Named in honor of the late President
event is a powerful means of piquing students’ interest, parof Germany, Paul von Hindenburg, the ship was the largest
ticularly those who are more disposed to a liberal arts focus.
zeppelin ever to fly, stretching an incredible 803.8 ft in length
Although we piloted this case study in an introductoryand boasting a maximum diameter of 135.1 ft. In comparison,
level laboratory setting, its interdisciplinary nature has broad
the Titanic was 883 ft in length while a modern Boeing 747
appeal, making it suitable for introductory physics and engiis only 250 ft. A double-decked gondola, constructed mainly
neering courses, senior-level courses on engineering ethics,
inside the hull to reduce aerodynamic drag, provided passenand courses involving flammability or the science of textiles.
gers with unparalleled luxury: 72 sleeping berths, washrooms,
The case study emphasizes to students that scientists no
dining room and bar, pressurized smoking room, and spalonger adopt a strictly passive approach to history. Instead,
cious lounge. A promenade with slanted windows allowed
scientists now take a forensics approach to major historical
passengers to gaze upon the scenery below. With four reversevents, bringing sophisticated analytical tools to scrutinize
ible 1200-hp diesel engines and cruising speed of 76 mph, the
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airship provided the quickest means of crossing the Atlantic,
cutting the typical transit time of contemporary ocean liners
in half.2
The ship was classified as a rigid airship because of its steel
frame. Within the steel structure were 16 large gas cells (or
bladders) made of gelatinized latex, designed originally to
hold inert helium gas. However, at that time, only the United
States, which had stockpiled the nonflammable gas as a byproduct of its mining of natural gas, had enough helium to
supply a fleet of airships. Even though the U.S. Helium Control Act of 1927 prohibited American export of helium to any
foreign nation, DELAG was hopeful it could convince the U.S.
government to export it. Unfortunately, tensions between the
United States and Germany deteriorated so the export ban was
never lifted. Therefore, DELAG made the decision to trade
safety for cost and reengineered the bladders to hold seven
million cubic feet of hydrogen as the lifting gas. Converting to
hydrogen also had the added benefit of giving the Hindenburg
more lift, increasing its capacity to an impressive 242.2 tons of
gross lift and 112.1 tons of useful lift. From the ship’s control
room, the crew could drop water ballast or release hydrogen
gas from ventilation shafts along the top of the ship to adjust
its buoyancy and trim. Last, the steel structure was covered by
panels of cotton cloth doped with various compounds. These
panels were stitched together to form a single, and presumably
electrically continuous, “skin.” The flammability of this outer
covering plays a pivotal role in the current debate surrounding
the ship’s destruction, so we postpone a detailed description of
the fabric until later. By May 1937, the Hindenburg was making the first flight of its second season of service, having already completed several safe trans-Atlantic journeys in 1936.
Public confidence in hydrogen-filled airships was soaring.

“The ship is riding majestically toward us”
The ship is riding majestically toward us like some
great feather …. It’s practically standing still now;
they’ve dropped ropes out of the nose of the ship,
and (uh) they’ve been taken ahold of down on the
field by a number of men. It’s starting to rain again.
On what would be its final voyage, the Hindenburg left
Frankfurt, Germany, at 7:16 p.m. on May 3, 1937, under the
command of Captain Max Pruss and First Officer Albert
Sammt. This was Pruss’s first time commanding the Hindenburg. The ship was scheduled to arrive at Lakehurst, NJ, at
6:00 a.m. on May 6, but unusually strong headwinds caused it
to run several hours behind schedule. As the ship approached
New Jersey, it encountered a storm before reaching the Lakehurst Naval Air Station at 4:15 p.m. The airfield was under the
command of Charles Rosendahl, who radioed the ship to delay landing until weather conditions improved. By 6:22 p.m.,
the storm had passed but conditions were rapidly worsening.
Rosendahl radioed the Hindenburg, recommending “the earliest possible landing.”

To understand the Hindenburg’s final approach to the
Lakehurst Naval Station, note that wind direction refers to
the direction from which the wind is coming. Also, navigational directions are denoted as follows: “bow” refers to the
front of the ship; “stern” refers to the back of the ship; “port”

Fig. 2. Approach of the Hindenburg. The thickening red line
represents a lowering elevation of the ship.

refers to the left side of the ship (when facing forward); and
“starboard” refers to the right side of the ship (when facing
forward). Facing an easterly wind, Pruss approached the airfield at 7:08 p.m. from the southwest at an elevation of about
650 ft to observe ground conditions (Fig. 2, Point A). At 7:09
p.m., he initiated a wide descending turn to port in order to
dock the ship pointing into the wind. This would maximize
the ship’s aerodynamic stability as passengers disembarked
(Fig. 2, Point B). Sammt lowered the Hindenburg’s elevation
by releasing hydrogen in 15-second intervals from various
ventilation shafts as the ship turned. At 7:16 p.m., Pruss was
lining the ship to the east at an elevation of about 400 ft when
the wind shifted from easterly to southwesterly, forcing Pruss
to again turn the ship for docking, this time facing southwest
(Fig. 2, Point C). With deteriorating weather conditions, little
room to maneuver, and anxious to land, Pruss decided to
execute a tight S-turn rather than make another large looping
pass over the airfield. He ordered a sharp turn to port followed by a sharp turn to starboard. Sammt continued to vent
hydrogen from various gas cells to lower the ship’s elevation
to 350 ft. At some point prior to, or during this S-turn, the
ship began to run heavy in the tail because at approximately
7:18 p.m., Sammt ordered two drops of 300 kg of water ballast
from the stern and valved five seconds of hydrogen from the
bow (Fig. 2, Point D). At 7:19 p.m., with the tail still heavy,
Sammt ordered one last drop of 500 kg of water ballast from
the stern and sent six crewmen to the front of the ship to help
lower the bow. Finally, at 7:21 p.m., the ship was at an elevation of 300 ft and roughly pointed into the wind (Fig. 2, Point
E). Although the ship was still heavy in the tail, the forward
grounding lines were dropped. A light rain began to fall. The
metal frame was now electrically grounded by the landing
lines.
269

“It’s burst into flames!”
It’s burst into flames! … and it’s crashing! It’s
crashing terrible! Oh, my! …. It’s smoke, and it’s
in flames now; and the frame is crashing to the
ground, not quite to the mooring mast. Oh, the humanity! And all the passengers screaming around
here .… Listen, folks; I … I’m gonna have to stop
for a minute because I’ve lost my voice. This is the
worst thing I’ve ever witnessed.
Using eyewitness accounts to determine the origin of the
fire proved confusing, but the first sign of trouble appears
to have been at the top, rear of the ship, just in front of the
vertical fin.3 Both R. H. Ward (stationed with the port bow
landing party) and R. W. Antrim (stationed atop the mooring
mast) testified that they noticed a fluttering of the ship’s outer
cover at this location — suggesting hydrogen was leaking out
of a rear interior bladder against the outer covering.3 Crewmen in the control stations of the lower fins testified hearing
“muffled detonations” near the top of the ship. When they
looked up, they saw bright red and yellow reflections of fire.3
By 7:25 p.m., a yellow flame appeared on the outside of the
ship at this spot. Within seconds, the tail section was engulfed
in flames. The ship managed to stay afloat for a few seconds,
but eventually the tail section sank, slamming crew and passengers 15-20 ft backwards into the rear walls of the control
room, cabins, dining lounge, and promenade. As the Hindenburg tilted upward, the fire traveled inside the ship along the
central axis until a blowtorch of fire erupted from the nose
(Fig. 3). Crewmen stationed in the bow were incinerated.
Most eyewitnesses described the Hindenburg as burning from the inside out. Within 30 seconds, the entire ship
crashed to the ground and rolled slightly starboard. In general, passengers and crew in the promenade or public areas
near the outside of the ship were able to jump to safety while
those deeper inside the ship (interior cabins and control stations) did not. Fortunately, many passengers had gathered in
the promenade to watch the landing. Some family members
lived or died based merely on a few feet of separation. Pruss
and Sammt stayed with the ship until it hit the ground. Both
men survived the crash, but Pruss was badly disfigured from
burns he received carrying crewmen from the wreckage. On
the ground, Herb Morrison had been assigned to cover the
landing because of his prior work in broadcasting from an
airplane. Normally, he would have been in Chicago covering a live musical program. After the tragedy, the 16-inch
green lacquer disk recordings of Morrison’s account, which
were actually damaged by debris from the burning airship,
were flown by airplane to Chicago and broadcast that night
from radio station WLS. In 1987, a small memorial pad was
dedicated on the 50th anniversary of the tragedy. The pad is
located on the site where the Hindenburg’s gondola landed.

Theories
Film footage coupled with Morrison’s audio account
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Fig. 3. The final moments of the Hindenburg. As the bow angled
upward, a blowtorch of fire erupted out of the nose. (Public
Domain)

brought a swift end to the era of zeppelins. The public would
never again feel safe aboard one. Subsequent investigations
by the United States and Germany were inconclusive in determining the cause of the fire. For years, scientists, politicians,
and military personnel put forth several theories as to the underlying causes of the disaster. Was it sabotage? No evidence
of sabotage was ever found. Was it a lightning strike? Unlikely
—the outer covering of the ship had several burn holes, some
as large at five centimeters in diameter, proving the ship had
survived in-flight lightning strikes during its first year of service.4 Today, a reexamination of the evidence leaves us with
two competing theories that at least agree on the fire’s source
of ignition. As the Hindenburg passed through the storm off
the New Jersey coast, it became electrically charged. When
the landing lines touched the ground prior to docking, they
“earthed” the Hindenburg’s steel frame but not every panel of
the ship’s fabric covering. A spark between the charged panel
of fabric and the grounded steel frame ignited some source of
fuel. The difference between the two theories lies in identifying that source of fuel.
• Leaking hydrogen gas: The most likely explanation of
events is that the electrostatic discharge ignited leaking hydrogen gas. Recall that during the sharp S-turn, Sammt was
unable to correct the ship’s trim. Experts agree that the ship
was undoubtedly leaking hydrogen from the stern.3 What
caused the leak? One theory suggests that the S-turn was uncommonly tight and that one of the rudder’s bracing cables
may have been overstressed to the point where it snapped and
slashed through a gas cell.5 Maybe something as simple as a
sticky valve was at fault. Regardless of the cause of the leak, an
explosive mixture of hydrogen gas and air floated above the
ship’s tail. Because this theory blames the ship’s demise on the
decision to land after the storm and on the S-turn made just
prior to docking, it was strongly refuted by Pruss and Rosendahl, both of whom always maintained the ship fell victim to
sabotage.

• Incendiary paint: In 1997, engineer Addison Bain put
forth the idea that at least early in the fire, the ship’s outer
covering itself, and not leaking hydrogen gas, was the primary
source of fuel for the fire.6 The cotton cloth that covered the
ship was doped with different mixtures based on cellulose
acetate butyrate (CAB), the base resin for what are commonly
called lacquers. The portion of cloth covering the lower half of
the ship was doped with a layer of pure CAB, then three layers
of CAB mixed with aluminum powder. The portion of cloth
covering the upper half of the ship was doped with a layer of
pure CAB, a layer of CAB mixed with iron oxide, and three layers of CAB mixed with aluminum powder. These coatings gave
the ship its distinctive reflective appearance and were used to
keep the outer skin taut for aerodynamic purposes as well as
to protect it from wind, water, and small objects. The added
layer of iron oxide on the upper portion of the ship protected
the interior gas bags from damage by UV radiation and overheating from IR radiation. Bain developed his theory when he
realized that these compounds are similar to the components of
thermite, a pyrotechnic composition that resembles a common
sparkler or the propellant in the space shuttle’s solid rocket
boosters. In short, Bain argued that the Hindenburg’s outer skin
was essentially a gigantic sparkler. According to Bain, the electric discharge was energetic enough to ignite the skin and cause
a dramatic exothermic reduction-oxidation reaction; therefore,
this idea has become known as the “Incendiary Paint Theory”
(IPT). The IPT has merit for two reasons: (i) Hydrogen burns
with an invisible flame, yet the Hindenburg was consumed in
an enormous yellow and red fireball. One might conclude that
something other than hydrogen was burning. (ii) The ship held
its position for a few seconds before the stern crashed to the
ground. One might conclude that the gas cells were intact when
the fire started. To test his idea, Bain obtained an actual remnant of fabric from the Hindenburg and ignited it with a continuous spark. The piece burned as a brilliant yellow burst that
looked like a miniature version of the Hindenburg disaster.7

Combining physics and history in the
laboratory
We used the IPT as the basis of a new, inexpensive lab activity focusing on a previously untapped topic in our course,
namely the flammability of fabrics. Since the IPT posits that
the propagation of the fire was due to burning of the Hindenburg’s fabric, we designed an investigation to quantify how
fabrics burn after the source of ignition is removed. Our activity is modeled after the vertical flame test, ASTM D 6413-99
—The Standard Test Method for Flame Resistance of Textiles
(Vertical Test), which has been adopted as an accepted federal
test standard.8 This protocol is considered to be the most fundamental and commonly used test on flame resistant fabrics in
the United States. To align with the ASTM protocols, English
units are used throughout the analysis. The equipment and
materials needed to create this activity cost under $30 and were
readily obtained from local hardware, fabric, and automotive refinishing stores. We piloted our activity on a cohort of

undergraduate students. We started by presenting students
with the historical background information described in the
previous sections. Next, we emphasized two concepts: (i) The
goal of our activity is not to prove or disprove the IPT, but to
showcase how physics can be used in the real world, and (ii)
Even though our activity focuses only on a vertical flame test,
it gives us a quantitative understanding of how flammability
is tested and how results can be used to unravel the Hindenburg disaster (obviously, combining our results with those
from a horizontal flame test would provide a more complete
analysis).
• Sample preparation: Because purchasing chemicals is
expensive and heavily regulated, reproducing the Hindenburg’s outer fabrics is simply not possible for most teachers.
Instead, we chose to test three fabrics that were easy to make
and inexpensive to buy, yet nicely approximate the outer coverings of the airship. First, we purchased swatches of pure cotton cloth and ironed them. Next, we purchased clear lacquer,
black primer with iron oxide as its tinting agent (iron oxide
black pigment, in powder form, can also be purchased online), and a concentrated aluminum resin paste (our specific
type was Genesis LV 1060 from Sherwin-Williams Paints). To
create the fabric that approximates the covering on the upper
portion of the ship, we rolled cotton swatches with a layer of
clear lacquer, then a layer of black primer, then three layers
of aluminum paste. To create the fabric that approximates
the covering on the lower portion of the ship, we rolled cotton swatches with a layer of clear lacquer, then three layers of
aluminum paste. After the coatings dried, we were left with
samples of pure cotton cloth and two stiff, reflective fabrics
that approximate the fabric on the lower and upper portions
of the Hindenburg. Students trimmed each of these three
samples into five strips (12 in x 3 in) and weighed each strip.
Each strip was placed into a frame of sheet metal that secured
the strip on two sides, leaving the bottom edge exposed. The
frame was clamped together at four locations and suspended
in a laboratory hood.
• Testing: A flat black poster background and dimmed
lights were used to enhance observation of burning fabrics
inside the hood. Precautions were taken to minimize drafts in
the hood. No attempt was made to control ambient temperature or pressure. No attempt was made to move the strips nor
to test a horizontal orientation of the strips. Each strip was
tested and the average of five strips was reported per fabric.
A Bunsen burner, with 10-mm inside diameter barrel, was
used to create a 1.5-in high 99%-pure methane flame. The
burner could be swiveled so that the exposed edge of the strip
was exactly 0.75 in above the top of the burner. The flame
was applied for 12 ± 0.25 s (flame-to-strip), as measured by a
stopwatch. Students filmed each trial using cell phone cameras in “slow motion” mode [Fig. 4 (a)]. Once the flame was
removed, students continued to film the strip until any visual
flame or glow self-extinguished [Fig. 4(b) and (c)]. These vid271

(a)

(b)

(c)

Fig. 4. Our apparatus for vertical flame testing. (a) Start of flame test. (b) Afterflame. (c) Afterglow.

eos would be used only to determine the duration of time, to
0.1-s resolution, that the samples burned and/or glowed. Any
signs of melting or dripping were noted. If a portion of the
strip remained intact, the strip was removed from the metal
frame so that students could apply the following specific tearing force to the strip: A crease was made running lengthwise
through the peak of the highest charred area and parallel to
the side of the strip. A hook was inserted into the strip 0.25
in from the charred edge. A weight was attached to the hook
depending on the strip’s weight per unit area (100 g for strips
68-203 g/m2; 200 g for strips 204-508 g/m2; 300 g for strips
509-780 g/m2; and 400 g for strips over 780 g/m2). With the
hook in place, students grabbed the other side of the charred
edge and raised the strip in a smooth, continuous motion
until the tearing of the strip along the crease stopped. Many
strips were totally consumed by the vertical flame so tearing
the strip was not necessary [Fig. 4(c)].
• Analysis: Using their video clips and a ruler, students determined or calculated the following:
• “Afterflame,” the time when a visible flame remained on
the strip, as determined from the cell phone video clips.
• “Afterglow,” the time when a visible glow remained on
the strip, as determined from the cell phone video clips.
• “Char length,” the distance from the exposed edge of
the strip to the furthest point of visible damage after the
tearing force was applied, as determined by measuring
the damaged portion of the strip with a ruler. Note that
the char length is 12 in if the strip is totally consumed by
the fire.
• “Vertical burn rate,” calculated as the char length divided by the afterflame.
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• “Vertical burn time” (designated as tlower or tupper), the
time, extrapolated from the vertical burn rate, needed
to burn a 106.1-ft long swatch of the strip (i.e., ¼ of the
Hindenburg’s maximum circumference). Because the
upper and lower portions of the ship were covered in
different fabrics, the maximum vertical distance a fabric
could burn is ~¼ the maximum circumference of the
ship.
• “Total vertical burn time,” the total time needed to
burn vertically one entire side of the ship. This time
was determined by adding the vertical burn times for
the fabrics covering the lower (tlower) and upper (tupper)
portions of the ship.
• Results: Table I shows data from a typical run of our activity. Results support the notion that leaking hydrogen, and
not incendiary paint, is the most plausible source of fuel for
the fire that consumed the Hindenburg. The outer fabrics just
do not burn at a fast enough rate to consume a ship the size of
the Hindenburg in a timeframe of the order of a minute. After
burning strips of pure cotton cloth, students dramatically see
that the dopants used on the Hindenburg’s fabric actually retard the spreading of fire. The dataset below shows that a fire
would need ~112 minutes to burn a distance roughly equal to
the height of the ship, that is to say, from the underside to the
topside of the ship. Experiments conducted by A. J. Dessler
on horizontal burn rates support our results and show a fire
would need 11-12 hours to burn a distance roughly equal to
the length of the ship.9,10 Dessler discounts the two merits
of the IPT explaining that the yellow fireball was actually the
fabric, wires, and steel girders burning with visible flames in
the invisibly burning hydrogen (as a mantle burns visibly in
a lantern, even though the gas that is actually burning may be

Table I.

Weight
per Area
(g/m2)

Afterflame
(s)

Afterglow
(s)

Char
Length
(in)

Dripping
or
Melting

Vertical
Burn
Rate
(in/s)

Vertical Burn
Time
(min)

Cotton cloth
114.8

4.1

5.5

12

No

2.9

7.3

Approximation of fabric covering lower portion of ship
287.0

30.1

32.4

12

No

0.40

tlower
= 53.2

Approximation of fabric covering upper portion of ship
344.4

33.4

36.8

12

No

0.36

Total Vertical Burn Time = tlower + tupper

invisible). Also, as the hydrogen burned the outer fabric and
rushed out of the bladders, air rushed in. This created updrafts
at the tail of the ship that were strong enough to keep the ship
momentarily afloat—just as a burning piece of paper is lifted
by the updraft created by its own fire. Finally, a 2007 episode
of the popular show “Myth Busters” (Episode 70 —“The Hindenburg Mystery”) found similar results and suggested that the
IPT, at least in the open sources, is doubtful.11 Although the
episode is not peer reviewed and should be viewed with some
skepticism, it is a phenomenal visual resource available to any
teacher and can be shown to students to emphasize or solidify
certain concepts. The episode serves as a good closure activity
and can be downloaded from iTunes for $1.99.

Conclusion and future considerations
The 80th anniversary of the Hindenburg disaster presents
a compelling case study that brings powerful teaching opportunities to a variety of disciplines. First, the anniversary
raises historical awareness in our students while bringing
real world applications of physics to them. Next, the physics
of flammability can be treated appropriately at the introductory level since only careful measurements of time, distance,
and weight are needed. In fact, our case study can serve as a
start-of-the-semester laboratory exercise where safety, measurement, and error analysis are emphasized. Conversely, our
case study can also serve as a capstone project in a senior-level
engineering course after which each student is required to
examine another engineering failure from history (e.g., Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows
Bridge, the Challenger disaster, etc.) and design an experiment with relevant operational definitions to test proposed
hypotheses. Third, the resulting analysis shows students that
just as scientific theories are open to reexamination in the
light of new or confounding observations, so too are historical
events open to revisitation and scrutiny. Next, the case study
demonstrates to students how a cascade of unlikely events
can result in an unpredictable catastrophe and how scientists
and engineers often test proxies when actual materials are unavailable or prohibitive to examine directly. Finally, our case

tupper
= 59.1

study perhaps provides the first opportunity
to introduce students to testing standards and
how the responses of materials and products
are determined.
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